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Abstract  
In the past years, Brazil has deployed a military takeover of dozens of favelas. Presenting data 
collected from 2012 to 2014 in one of the favelas, I argue that the process of ‘pacification’ is 
an attempt of passive revolution, which depends more on manufacturing spatial hegemony 
with non-military strategies than on the war of manoeuvre that is currently being undertaken. 
This is developed through the articulation of the theoretical framework of Gramsci with 
Lefebvre’s perspective of the production of space, which exposes the failure to overcoming 
the fragile presence of state in the territory through everyday state formation. 
Keywords. state building, favelas, Brazil, Gramsci, Lefebvre, hegemony, passive 
revolution. 
Introduction 
The ‘show’ that the government of Rio de Janeiro screened for the world, in which police 
forces dominated the favelas through the use of heavy military apparatus, hardly goes 
unnoticed. However, in many ways, being noticed is the idea of the program ‘UPPs - 
Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora’ (Pacifying Police Units), a security policy deployed in 
nearly forty favelas.1 This program is a political effort, sponsored jointly by the government 
and big corporations, which also involves civil society organizations. All these elements, in 
addition to how favela’s territories are chosen and ‘occupied’, produce an interesting redesign 
of state relations, which Gramsci2 would have called ‘passive revolution’. This revolution is 
noticeably changing the spaces of favelas, and the multiplicity of organizations acting jointly 
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to cope with this transformation - NGOs, UPP Social, Army, just to mention a few – reveals 
its strategic importance.  
The territories of favelas are instances of failed or weak states. Since drug dealers and 
their gangs dominated favelas and established their own jurisdiction in these territories, the 
discourse produced by the ruling class has defined them as the main source of violence in the 
city.3 I will analyse here the struggle for hegemony in these territories, as proposed by 
Antonio Gramsci, for understanding statecraft in favelas. This process can be better 
comprehended if considered the spatial aspects involved in the construction of hegemony. In 
effect, the struggle for hegemony is limited to specific territories, in which various economic, 
political and ideological systems overlap, and the representation of state contradicts its spatial 
practices. For this reason, the articulation of Lefebvre’s production of space is very useful. 
Other researches have attested the importance of political economy and spatial development 
for the analysis of the reconstruction of so-called fragile states.4 These investigations move 
beyond the classic Weberian understanding of state and examine the historical processes of 
state formation as necessarily linked to the social struggles of power. 
I argue in this paper that the process of pacification undertaken in Brazilian favelas is 
an attempt at passive revolution for crafting state, which depends more on manufacturing 
hegemony using non-military strategies than on the war of manoeuvre that is currently being 
undertaken. The main concepts related to passive revolution, such as war of 
manoeuvre/position, were interpreted in terms of their spatial manifestations (representations 
of space, representational space and spatial practices) to reveal the mechanisms and 
motivations for which spaces and power relations are being reorganized. The contribution of 
this paper is two-fold: i) it extends the theoretical articulation of Lefebvre and Gramsci, 
beyond the focus on the category of hegemony, with the application in a new contemporary 
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case; ii) It interprets the Brazilian case of favelas pacification using socio-spatial lens that 
reveal novel aspects of this on-going process, such the ideological struggle in the territory. 
In the next section, I set out key concepts of Gramsci and Lefebvre’s work, which are 
used in the methodological design of the research. Next, I highlight the underlying reasons for 
pacification, depicting life in these communities before the program was deployed and how 
the ruling class framed their existence. This is followed by a historical account of the process 
of take-over, structured in different spatial dimensions (representation of space, 
representational space, and spatial practices), which reveals important elements of passive 
revolution. Next, I describe what I believe to be the spatial contradictions of this process, and 
finally summarize how the adopted theoretical approach discloses the interests of the market 
that drive this integration. 
The spatial reading of Gramsci and the struggle for power in favelas  
The social space of hegemony 
State can be understood as a balance of coercion, fraud/corruption, and active consent, or 
what Gramsci named “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion”.5 An important 
characteristic of Gramsci’s work is the subversion of the classical Marxist rule of the 
determination of the economic base over the ideological superstructure. Unlike what had been 
taught before, the ideological domain (superstructure) determined by institutions from 
political and civil societies also establishes the control of production. Coutinho6 contends that 
the rupture with economic determination does not mean a rupture with historical materialism, 
only that the materiality is no longer restricted to economic spheres. Lefebvre7 sponsored an 
analogous innovation by connecting the embodied dimensions of space as dialectical and 
inseparable components of the production of social space, and so mobilising the spatial 
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mechanisms of production of space can open inroads to understanding how superstructure 
influences the attainment of power. 
According to the Gramscian superstructural determination, the working class sustains 
the power of the state by means of active consent. The obtained consent is maintained both by 
economic domination and intellectual and moral leadership, it is achieved through the 
establishing of hegemony. Hegemony is the way the ruling class ensures its control over the 
state. It is constructed by ideas that are propagated as the common sense of a society, tying 
this society together in a historical bloc interpenetrating the economic and ideological 
spheres.  
An historical act can only be performed by “collective man”, and this presupposes the 
attainment of a “cultural-social” unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, 
with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal 
and common conception of the world. 8 
Two forms of control are enacted by the state: consensual control, which arises when 
common sense is voluntarily assimilated; and coercive control, manifested through the direct 
use of force, when hegemonic leadership is not enough. In this perennial dialectic relation 
between political society (which owns the domination function through coercion) and civil 
society (which exerts hegemony through consensus), the predominance of one function over 
the other will depend on the degree of socialization and correlation of forces among the 
classes. Gramsci was aware that different contexts demand different strategies for revolution. 
Hence, he differentiates war of manoeuvre (frontal attack) from war of position (ideological 
struggle). In both cases, the implementation of one or other strategy acquires social existence 
to the extent that it produces its space, and territory becomes the arena where war is waged. 
There are various spatial dimensions involved in this struggle, and thus the perspective of the 
historical production of space can be insightful in this regard, especially when observed over 
time.  
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The history of space is not a chain of dated events or a sequence of structures. It 
unfolds from the continuous production of this space, which shifts abruptly only when a new 
mode of production emerges. In other words, every mode of production has its own space, 
and the social relations of production are continuously leaving their mark on space. Whenever 
the contradictions avoid this to happen, the balance of power is shifted, and a new mode of 
production may be installed. Analysing the hegemonic space is thus the key to understand the 
conditions of revolution and attainment of power, which is related to the voluntary or 
compulsory subjugation of individuals to state authority.  
The idea of social space proposed by Lefebvre and the spatial realisation of ideologies 
was later advanced by more contemporary authors who discuss theoretically9 and 
empirically10 how intertwined the concepts of space and social justice are when analysing the 
consummation of urban processes under capitalism. In that sense, favelas – and the criminal 
gangs that make use of these territories as logistic hubs11 – become the outcome of a 
dialectical reorganisation of the city that tries to deny these social enclaves from which 
existence the market cannot preclude. In observing this socio-spatial development, space 
cannot be seen as a homogeneous construction, and when analysing the crafting of hegemonic 
spaces one should consider the overlapping and even contradictory relationships that define a 
complex politico-juridical system: 
[…] “each fragment of space subjected to analysis masks not just one social relationship 
but a host of them that analysis can potentially disclose” (Lefebvre, 1991b, page 88). In 
this sense, the politico-juridical defined space of the nation-state is one territory among 
many and not necessarily the hegemonic one. 12 
As a matter of fact, understanding space as inhabited by multiple territorialities is in 
line with Gramsci’s realization that hegemony is an ever-building project and conjunctures of 
contradictory opposition are expected to happen, “since no social formation will ever admit 
that it has been superseded”.13 However, a dominant group will usually control the apparatus 
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of coercion, which in certain contexts can only be achieved with violence. In his seminal 
work, Lefebvre also comments on the need of violence for the creation of previously 
spaceless states, and accepts that even the endurance of this new state is subjected to some 
level of violence toward a space.14  The actual shifting of power relations will only take place 
when the new productive forces disrupt the organic production of a given territory and 
supersede the hegemonic spaces with an effective war of position, i.e. ideological war. When 
considering the necessary strategy for building the Italian state, Gramsci incorporated the 
concept of passive revolution as the reorganization of economic, political, and ideological 
relations. Passive revolution is thus a dialectical overcoming of the war of manoeuvre which 
gives place to the war of position, in a transition marked by political struggle.15 
Considering the perspective explained above, in order to understand how the 
hegemonic space is produced, it is important to consider their analytical constituents, which 
represent the necessary zones of interventions to obtain hegemony. Lefebvre suggested a triad 
of (dialectical) constituent spaces: representations of space – where space is designed and 
conceptualized; representational space – space lived and associated to its symbolic 
apprehension; and spatial practice – defining the space of production and reproduction.16 
Again, these three aspects are not detached but rather mutually determine each other, even 
though they are not coincident. These three dimensions organize the analysis of the passive 
revolution in Rio.  
The territorialisation of power struggle at favelas 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, an increasing share of the population of Rio settled in 
favelas, as a result of different cycles of industrialization which have pushed for the 
concentration of people in cities but were never able to respond to the associated housing 
demand17. For a long time favelas have been socially invisible and from the 1920s dwellers 
had faced constant threats of eviction, as favelas started being seen as an “aberration” in the 
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city18. The first state actions intended to deal with the “problem” of favelas were actions of 
eviction aimed to eliminate them once for all19. Delegitimizing and segregating favelas 
motivated the reinforcement over time of their own social arrangement and social identity. 
This does not mean that favelas are detached territories, as their social circuits are also 
intertwined with the formal city and in the past decades investigations also demonstrated the 
constant exchanges between favelas and the city, in intimate relationships with the global 
system20. However, in many aspects, the favelas became considerably departed from the 
hegemonic city, a separation enacted discursively as much as through the differential access 
to public services21. 
Since the 1940s, the three different jurisdictional levels of government (municipal, 
state, federal) have struggled through different initiatives to urbanize favelas. More recently, 
they have tried also to tackle the issue of criminal gangs that dominated these spaces, 
(although drug trafficking also occurs in other areas of the city).22 The social segregation and 
limited access to public services in favelas facilitated the took over of these territories by drug 
dealers, which I argue establish in each territory a parallel ‘state’ authority, dominated by 
drug trafficking. This is overlapped with the complex network of criminality in Rio, which 
connects different favelas, aggregating higher scale organizations of drug traffickers – or 
“comandos”, as they call it – fighting over territories between themselves, in addition to the 
dispute with the formal state.23 This indetermination in the territories of favelas caused by the 
power struggle in each favela would illustrate what Gramsci called “crisis of authority”24, and 
which configures in each favela also instances of ‘weak state’.25 In the recent decades, 
governors of Rio have used various strategies to deal with the drug dealers operating in the 
favelas: covering up its existence, massive confrontation, negotiation, and finally the military 
occupation.  
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The hegemonic spaces of favelas – which as in any hegemonic space presuppose 
relations of coercion and voluntary consent – were to a great extent controlled by traffickers. 
As a matter of fact, drug traffickers had a well-established economic, political and ideological 
system, as could be observed in ethnographic researches developed in favelas dominated by 
drug trafficking.26 The mechanisms of institutional control used by the drug dealers were vast. 
Public services, such as social support and healthcare funding, were most of the times 
provided by the traffickers who would then keep state away. But despite such spatial practices 
crafting a relationship of dependence and consent, frequent episodes of violence and coercive 
ruling suggest that the hegemony obtained in the territory by these drug traffickers was an 
unstable equilibrium highly dependent on their heavy apparatus of coercion. 
In order to examine the spatial disputes in the territory, I collected data from one of the 
pacified favelas, which I will call here “Marabá”. Thousands of people live tightly in this 
favela, in a space with housing density eight times higher than the city’s average. Starting my 
incursions in this community in 2009, I had observed the unfolding events of pacification and 
its implications over a period of three years of informal and eventual contact with the 
residents of this territory, but not from a formally set up piece of research. In 2012, when 
participating to a larger research, the implications of UPP were among the striking aspects of 
the re-organisation of favela space. These were further developed for two weeks in 2013, and 
more systematically in 2014, when I spent 10 weeks performing participant observations and 
interviews at the favela. Other than sixteen interviews with local residents, four interviews 
with representatives of the police and the government were then conducted. During this later 
period of fieldwork, I worked in two local organisations and attended many events which took 
place at Marabá. In that moment, the favela was living one of its most agitated periods since 
the deployment of the UPP unit, with confrontations between the police and drug dealers 
taking place, and the pacification was then put into question. 
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Even though the whole primary collected data was not systematically framed as a 
single piece of research directed to the objectives of the present discussion, my long 
experience in the favela allowed me to examine closely a longitudinal change in the territory. 
These data were then revisited with the focus on the question: what do the categories of 
passive revolution and social space tell us about the reasons for the current instability at the 
favela? The primary data collected – generated from participant observation diaries and 
interviews transcriptions – was also complemented with official documents published by 
governmental institutions and media news collected to illustrate some of the arguments 
presented in this study. The texts were coded to identify emerging themes on space and 
statecraft, highlighted in excerpts that discussed the struggle for power in the territory.  
Intended take-over: the underlying reasons for pacification 
One of the main instruments of drug dealers to establishing its hegemony at Favela Marabá 
was the authority to control the access to the territory, determining the local spatial practices, 
and hence the mediators of state power. This was explained to me by Zico27, the president of 
the residents association:  
[…] traffickers wouldn’t allow [outsider] social projects, you see… only what they 
thought was for the good would be allowed to enter, the ones they picked […] so, 
traffickers left the favela halted for 30 years, the government could not enter, even if they 
wished, they couldn’t. 28  
One of the most evident forms of control at the favela was thus the restriction of 
access. By “social projects”, Zico referred to governmental and NGOs interventions in the 
favela. The participation of these institutions was limited to the eventual presence of a few 
representatives, mostly performing social works and philanthropy. By obeying the traffickers’ 
enactment of what was allowed or forbidden, government representatives and NGOs – the 
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practitioners who initially intended to revert or alleviate such separation29 – ended up reifying 
the production of a particular space detached from the city.  
But many times, obeying was the only choice, and the extent of this control in the 
residents association for example shows how much the imposition of trafficking regulation 
impacted mainly dwellers. In an interview with the then vice-president of residents 
association at Marabá, which I will call Thaisa, she explained to me how she became 
president of the organisation at the beginning of 2000s. One day she passed casually in their 
office during the evening and found people scared with the recent news: the then president 
had been expelled from the favela by the drug boss, and there was a notice for her to go 
‘uphill’ and meet him. She called the other 13 directors and went with the group for the 
meeting. The drug boss told the group that the president had been tossed off from the favela 
and Thaisa would now assume as the new president. Apparently there were unrevealed 
businesses between the ex-president and the drug dealers, which had not ended well. Though 
scared with the shocking news, Thaisa then imposed her conditions: “I will assume, but you 
don’t mess with my association and I don’t mess with your business”. He responded, “very 
well, I won’t mess with the association, whatever you do is done”.  However, this was not 
how things went on, as Thaisa explained: 
Later on he got crazy and wanted to know all the steps of the association. He expelled 
many people from the community and the others got afraid and started selling their 
houses. But for that, the transaction needed to be done at the association, and nobody 
could sell their properties because he wanted to know why each house was sold and 
persecuted these people. He would take me from my home to know about one or another 
guy… that was hell! When he called me, his guys would knock my door ‘he is calling 
you’, ‘ok, wait a minute that I will change’, ‘no, you will not change, you will come the 
way you are’. I have been there with my jersey once. The neighbours would see it, close 
their doors and windows and wait for the parting shot, thinking I was going to be killed. 
Many times I was saved from such enquiries because the police would turn up, then his 
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soldiers blew the whistle. Back then they would use whistles to indicate that the police 
were coming. Then he would say: ‘you go back to your home, we will continue later’. 30 
For decades, the residents’ association was for the favela what the governmental 
agencies would be for the formal city. As in many other favelas, they would regulate space 
and provide services of registration and mediation of transactions, such as a small council. 
They would also interact with the formal authorities when they needed to request some 
intervention from the state, i.e. public illumination. This is a collectively enacted power, 
which was often co-opted though by the local drug barons. Being subjected to the orders of 
the local drug boss, any decision would be reinforced (and sometimes implemented) by the 
drug dealers. This strong power held by drug dealers in favelas, which supported also other 
crimes in the city, helped constructing in society the idea of favelas as “territories of 
violence”, as though favelas were the only sources of violence and their dwellers conniving 
with trafficking.31 As demonstrated by Pearlman, the stereotypes associated with the idea of 
favelas, which composes what the author calls the “marginality myth”32, were used to justify 
policies from the ruling class directed to favelas.  
The perception of favelas as the source of criminality in the city had been thus 
incorporated in the ‘representation of space’33 of the elite in Rio. Eventually, the city was 
awarded the hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, increasing 
concerns on the “issue” of favelas. In 2008, a rare confluence of political allies occupied the 
three offices, allowing a state-level security policy to have the necessary political articulation 
with federal and municipal levels to launch the UPP program. The idea was to militarily 
occupy the favelas where drug traffickers had existed for a long time, building police stations 
(“pacification units”) in these territories. The formal objective of the program is to regain 
control of the territories terminating the disputes between drug dealers, and in order for that to 
happen the first stage is the takeover by the elite squad, which arrest, kill or expel local gang 
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leaders. Therefore, the objective of the program was not the end of criminality or drug 
dealing, but to regain power.34  
Marabá received its unit of the UPP program many years ago. That involved the 
previous intervention in the territory by the elite squad and the later deployment of a 
permanent unit with nearly 200 cops specifically trained for the purpose of peacefully 
occupying favelas, a new model of actuation for the police in Rio. The authority over the 
favela would no more be exercised by drug dealers, but should finally be given to the state. 
After decades of confrontation between the police and drug dealers, Zico described me when 
he realised for the first time that that was a different approach carried on by the police:  
[…] Then the UPP came […] I saw that it had come to stay with two hundred-odd men. 
[…] then after one week the captain went there and told me… Zico, I came here with all 
this information about you, what I am going to do with you is this: I brought you my 
telephone number, I would like yours and ... I do not want any information from you, I 
came from the intelligence service, I know everything that happens here... so it's all set, if 
you need anything… I saw that he really came to stay... 35 
Zico told me later that he then understood that the governance at the favela was 
changing: “I had to decide who I would obey, I told them [traffickers] that now I would only 
talk to the government”. The first stage of the takeover of favelas is not easy. It consists in a 
war of manoeuvre aimed to overruling powerful apparatus of drug gangs and occupying the 
territory militarily. The war of manoeuvre is a frontal attack, and was described by Gramsci 
based on societies where a centralized state had failed to develop a strong hegemony, as the 
civil society institutions were weaker in relation to a strong state.  
However, the determination with which the legal state tried to regain control of many 
territories was not the same in every informal settlement dominated by trafficking. The 
surprising aspect is again their spatial distribution, i.e. how they are concentrated on specific 
regions. The upper left of Figure 1 shows the map of the city of Rio de Janeiro with each 
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district. The darker shades indicate the higher density of favelas in the area, as accounted by 
the governmental geography institute in 201036, which totalled more than one thousand 
informal settlements all over the city. Virtually all of them were under the control of an armed 
gang before the beginning of UPPs. However, the chosen places for occupation are pretty 
much concentrated on specific zones of the city, and the prioritized zones did not even 
correspond to the higher presence of favelas or the most violent ones.37 
 
--Figure 1 here-- 
Figure 1 – Map of Rio indicating the density of favelas per territory (top) and UPP units (main map) 
implemented by the end of 2013 in different rounds of occupation (source: Designed with data from 
Google Maps; Base Cartográfica IPP/DIC; IBGE) 
 
A different sort of armed force dominates most of the favelas where UPPs have not 
been implemented, especially in the west side of the city: the militia. The militia in Rio are 
organized groups formed, in general, by police, military firemen or prison guards, which 
provide security to the local population in exchange of benefits such as charging fees.38 At the 
first moment, they were not repelled by the state, as they were welcomed for preventing drug 
traffickers in those territories, which would mean the production of a counter-hegemonic 
space in relation to the power of drug dealers.39 In order to become a state, innovatory forces 
have to eliminate oppositionists and win the assent from allies40, and the militia at that 
moment were the allies. 
Figure 1 also shows that the places chosen for occupation can be distinguished in 
different turns in the first five years of implementation: 1) six UPP units were deployed from 
11/2008 to 01/2010; 2) twelve UPP units were deployed from 04/2010 to 11/2011; 3) ten UPP 
units were deployed in 2012; and 4) eight UPP units were deployed in 2013. With few 
exceptions, this order probably observed the following undisclosed priorities: 1) the 
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wealthiest area in the city, where the ruling class live, focused in the southeast of the city; 2) 
the main access routes to the wealthiest area, including the Olympic area, where many 
Olympic facilities were being built/reformed around the east side; 3) favelas located in the 
surroundings of the international airport: 4) the most violent places that had not yet been 
dominated by militia, at the north side. Even though the main objective of the UPP program is 
related to ending violence, many violent favelas had not had a UPP unit installed for five 
years, which suggests the program is rather intended to fight a localised violence.41 
This war of manoeuvre occurred at the moment when capitalism needed to work 
smoothly in the country, and the adaptation of a fragmented system could no longer be 
postponed, as it also happened in the case of Americanism/Fordism discussed by Gramsci.42 
In the Brazilian context, the favelas chosen for pacification are the ones that supported the 
capitalist structuration of the city, and enable the transition from representational spaces of a 
particular elite to overall representations of space, i.e. the construction of the abstract space of 
capitalism.43 
How the Passive Revolution Takes Place 
Representation of space: the use of propaganda 
Soon after the pacification of the first favelas, newspapers of Rio were praising the 
program. The role of mass media in Rio was strong and apparently effective in the 
accreditation of the success of UPPs. Among the newspaper stories I compiled regarding 
UPPs, many of them effusively celebrated the program, as can be seen in the headlines: 
“Benefits way beyond the Hills”44; “On Rocinha Occupation, the redemption of São Conrado 
[area]”45; “Pacification in Rio will work as the model for national pledge”46. This propaganda 
was spread over the city, and even residents reinforced this message at times. During an 
interview that I had done in 2012, I asked a senior resident about the difference between a 
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wealthy area where he went to work every day, and Marabá. He answered: “The difference 
does not exist because […] nowadays people say over there too: here is good, it’s special! The 
way it is here, as in others [favelas] that have UPP, everything is… calm, you know?”.47 
Much of the interview was dedicated to praising the UPP, even though no direct 
question was posed on that regard. The informant declared living in a “good” condition, as do 
residents from other favelas that had been pacified (“over there too”). The only distinction 
made in the text was the difference between “before” and “nowadays”, marking two different 
time periods. The former refers to the period without UPP and the latter to the new times, 
when the predication is “everything is calm”, making it “special”. This sole change – caused 
by the event of “UPP” – made him indifferent to all the deprivation of basic rights endured by 
the people who lived where he did (such as poor sanitation, exposure to waste, and abuse of 
elderly people), even though he later acknowledged how these rights had always been assured 
to people who lived in the richer area where he worked.  
In western societies, where civil society institutions tend to be stronger and more 
intricate, the war for power should take place as a cultural and ideological struggle. According 
to Gramsci, organic ideologies can be articulated to change the productive infrastructure 
through the psychological operation of people’s consciousness, using common sense to 
organize human masses.48 A war of position can only be waged once the apparatus of coercion 
has been established. Gramsci explained this transition from the war of manoeuvre to the war 
of position as related to passive revolution, in which “the war of manoeuvre subsists so long 
as it is a question of winning positions which are not decisive, so that all the resources of the 
state’s hegemony cannot be mobilized”.49 Indeed, the initial confrontation at favelas were 
expected to create a crisis in the economic system of drug dealers, not necessarily ceasing the 
drug dealing in the territory but keeping subaltern members passive and separated from their 
leaders, such as Zico, who revealed he had to decide who to obey.  
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Controlling the legitimate representations of space is the main mechanism for the 
attainment of hegemony. This usually focuses on two spheres: private organizations and the 
activities of intellectuals. The former is composed of civil society institutions: church, unions, 
mass media, political parties, etc., while the intellectuals (broadly understood) create 
ideologies to educate the people and unify social forces, in order to secure the hegemony of 
the dominant group. The government of Rio relied initially mainly on the power of 
propaganda and mass media as an instrument of construction of hegemony and, only after two 
years started implementing more territorial initiatives, in order to assure the involvement of 
subaltern leaders in the common representation of space (see next).  
Gramsci acknowledged the importance of propaganda as an instrument of the ruling 
class for obtaining consent50 and this discursive production is also the fashioning of new 
representations of space. The interest of mass media in this passive revolution is embedded in 
capitalist corporations’ objectives, and according to Gramscian theory they are also associated 
to state: “It is true that conquest of power and achievement of a new productive world are 
inseparable, and that propaganda for one of them is also propaganda for the other”.51 One of 
the main roles performed by mass media is thus to reproduce the discursive (and abstract) 
representation of space52 coined by the elite to be absorbed by the general common sense in 
each every territory. That impacts also in the representational space of favela inhabitants – 
such as the resident I asked about the difference between the favela and the area where he 
would work – which can be influenced through the transformation culture.  
Representational space: the transformation of culture 
Pacified favelas are now the recipient of many government cultural programs and cultural 
industry’s initiatives. In this regard, several ‘celebrities’ – icons of the cultural industry – have 
promoted visits to the pacified favelas. The list includes both national – e.g. Gustavo Kuerten, 
Luciano Huck – and international – Beyoncé, Lady Gaga – personalities, especially in favelas 
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with consolidated UPP units, like Marabá. But more than infusing a commodified culture, the 
visits of celebrities help establishing favelas as abstract spaces, legitimizing interventions into 
their cultures. It was absorbing the culture of favelas that for the first time favelas started 
being “incorporated to the social life” of the city53, and now it is arguably in absorbing the 
culture of the city that favelas incorporate the social space of the city.  
Traditionally, the culture of favelas is strongly related to ‘funk music’. During my 
observations at Marabá, in several occasions young people were singing, dancing or just 
listening (in loud speakers) to funk or rap – which are sometimes indistinguishable styles. 
Funk and samba are the main musical styles at the Marabá community, and also reckon its 
role in placing poor black people at the centre.54 However, funk music has also been for a long 
time associated to drug traffickers, and most songs would exalt the power of traffickers and 
incite violence. Funk fests were then forbidden at communities with UPPs following the 
pacification, which generated many complaints by inhabitants who faced the prohibition of 
their traditional funk fests.55  
During the events of Rio+20 world summit, cultural presentations were organized in 
favelas to take the ‘spirit’ of the conference to these territories, promoting a particular type of 
culture. At Marabá, several (dance and music) groups presented themselves in three different 
sites. Among the fourteen different attractions there were groups of capoeira, samba, 
nordestina culture, hall dancing, poetry and even jazz and classical music (which are very 
alien to working class communities in Brazil). No funk presentation was invited. The 
consumption of culture legitimized by the ruling class helps crafting social signification in the 
reproduction of spontaneous consent56, and a suitable culture for hegemony was arguably 
being crafted in those spaces by excluding the ones considered non-hegemonic.  
Culture plays a major role in the construction of hegemony, as demonstrated by the 
pervading presence of culture in Lefebvre’s articulation between the conscious and 
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unconscious, which is depicted in the representational space (lived space), of symbols and 
images. In particular, the material culture is the most tangible symbol of the inhabited space. 
The confluence of different representational spaces at favelas is thus part of the production of 
the abstract space of capitalism57, although performed by other means. The contradiction that 
the old representational spaces symbolised, linked to the violence against the ruling class, 
triggered its marginalization and the crafting of alternative spaces of hegemony. And this case 
not only illustrates the transformation of culture but also reinforces the control of territory and 
increase of enlarged state, through the modelling of civil society spatial practices.  
Spatial practices: the control of territory and enlargement of state 
After the take over from the state, public representatives from various secretaries were 
deployed in Marabá. However, the governmental actions were highly non-coordinated, and 
many times contradictory. One of the civil servants allocated at the favela to promote 
initiatives of development, told me she had never been instructed on what she was supposed 
to do, and decided by herself the strategy of work. In addition, her organisation was part of 
the Secretary of Human Rights, and whenever there was a meeting at the office in which 
representatives of the Secretary of Security were present, distinct views on the favela would 
generate fiery arguments. Such lack of cohesiveness rejects the homogeneous systematization 
of knowledge through which power would be exerted, and illustrates the role of space as locus 
of disputes between knowledge and action.58 
In effect, none of the deployed state actions could be compared to the presence of 
police force, composed of nearly 200 officers in the territory59, which suggested what the 
dominant spatial practice was. Displacing drug traffickers and taking over the control of the 
territories was the main idea underpinning the program of “pacification”60, this would remove 
from drug dealers the necessary resource they needed to perform their territorialised practices 
of criminality.61 But the focus of the Brazilian state in the control of the territory for achieving 
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the advertised “pacification” cannot preclude of its enlargement in the Gramscian sense. Thus, 
controlling the territory should be the condition for the occupation of its social space, which 
would enable performing their own spatial practices. And the spatial practices established by 
the state in partnership with the civil society at Marabá concentrated in one specific site: the 
biggest and most spacious building of the favela, a public property. There the state granted 
public space for the development of various civil society organisations, mostly coming from 
the outside and in aligned with external hegemony.  
However, there were local voices to be heard, and as the police tried to purports a new 
image to the residents, attempts to strengthening the bonds with the community were made in 
meetings with the community leaders, i.e. Gramsci’s intellectuals. However, residents needed 
much more than the state was offering, as described by Victor, another resident of Marabá: 
When the UPP got in, they would make an ‘approximation meeting’, which we… every 
15 days… we would convey to them all the difficulties we had, and we didn’t want to 
know if UPP was a public security thing, we would overflow all that shit that happened 
here… waste collection issues, neighbour quarrels, whatever problem we would get there 
and complain it all [giggles]. Fuck, the state was absent in a way, we would report to the 
drug dealers before. But since the state came in with all the social idea and all, we wanted 
all that shit here that was halted. Because before we would say to the drug dealers ‘there 
is no water supply here’, and the guy would say ‘there is no water, what can I do? Would 
you like some money to buy medicines?’.62  
As Victor explained, the presence of the police was the first stable and significant 
official presence of the state in the favela. The kind of approximation the community was 
expecting then was one that made sense to the role of state; nonetheless whilst the government 
made a big effort to signify the pacification as the ‘solution’ to the issues of favelas, its actual 
presence in the territory remained very much linked to the idea of an apparatus of coercion. 
The Gramscian state is a balance between political society – or state in the strict sense of 
coercion – and civil society – composed of the group of organizations that produce and 
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disseminate ideologies.63 This concept of enlarged state should represent, hence, much more 
than just its managerial and repressive apparatus, including institutions of civil society which 
function as private hegemonic apparatus acting as much economically as culturally. If the 
state was willing to meet with civil society leaders, and establish communication with them, it 
is remarkable that it wouldn’t be able to respond to what was being asked. 
Machiavelli argued that state becomes material only with the control of a sizeable 
territory64, and this example shows how civil society mediates such materiality. The only 
organisations which were given conditions for their organising practices were the ones 
connected to the elite on a higher scale, decreeing the demise of many local initiatives which 
remained spaceless. As previously explained, the development of the superstructure is based 
on the civil society functioning as the ideological apparatus of state, aiming at the 
construction of spatial hegemony, as the practices enacted by civil society organizations could 
have been practices of state organisation.65 This isolation of the local civil society was one of 
the causes that led to a continuous crisis of authority.  
 
Permanent crisis of authority: contradictions and consequences 
During my fieldwork, the police killed a young resident of Marabá, who I will call David. It 
was not the first time a person had been killed in the favela shot by the police. However, the 
commotion around this case was particularly intense, because David was a very friendly 
person and many residents at the favela admired him for his art. Especially the youngest 
people in the favela demonstrated angry and furious reactions, and Facebook pages were full 
of comments of the sort “Grieving David. Rest in piece, justice will be made. UPP, fuck 
you!”. Demonstrations were also planned in the following week in solidarity to the artist.  
But at the favela, some residents told me in confidence they were not comfortable with 
echoing a protest with hidden origins and which had propagated so much violence. The day 
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David was found killed, cars were burned during the demonstration and even local residents 
suffered the consequences of the revolt. Then, on the day David was buried, traffickers 
ordered every organisation in the perimeter of the favela to keep the doors closed until 3pm. A 
few days later, when human rights militants organised a demonstration, drug dealers vetoed in 
the territory any activity not related to the protest, and I was advised by a local friend not to 
come to the favela. In a conversation with another resident, whose husband owns a shop in the 
favela, she explained to me why he shut the doors of his business that day: 
- So on Thursday everything was closed, why was that? Did they order to shut the doors? 
- They did. Those who can give orders and those who are sensible obey them. They 
decreed shutting.66  
Orders of shutting doors were common in favelas dominated by drug dealers, but 
should not be in pacified favelas. Drug dealers continued to perform their productive spatial 
practices, i.e. dealing drugs, and unsurprisingly the influence exerted in associated 
representational spaces was likewise maintained. The demonstrations organised at the 
community leveraged the dissatisfaction of dwellers with the pacification, and a petition 
against the UPP was later signed by hundreds of residents. In order to understand what is 
specific in the context of pacification that upset residents, it is important to understand that the 
arrival of the UPP at the favela breaks the socially complex dynamic space at the favela by 
ignoring the cultural codes which were followed by the trafficking and other local 
organisations. As much as physical violence and safety threats cannot be dismissed – being 
important and serious consequences of the dispute between rival drug gangs, these quarrels 
were part of the social space67 of the drug dealers before, as illustrated by Victor, who argued 
the favela was now ‘discovered’ by the state (in their new way of dealing with it), but had 
always been there. He was talking about the dynamics of dispute against different comandos, 
which would always invade with the support of local dwellers.  
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A group which invades the community, […] they are able to know the history of the 
community: who they should respect, who… who… you know, they have a drug dealing 
activity, that [killing] is an action inside that [activity], one will only die if is involved in 
drug dealing. They are able to understand that that lady is very important to the 
community, she needs to be respected, that the elderly should be respected here, they 
know the history. They pass over from one generation to the other; they know the history 
of the community.68  
As discussed by Victor, even though the violence of drug dealers cannot be dismissed 
as unimportant, it was incorporated to the social space of the favela. Drug dealers 
“understand” who should be respected and “know the history” of the community. Because 
hegemony is realised in space, and space is historically produced, the manipulation of 
practices and representations are always built over the existent space. Thus, dwellers 
accommodate in their everyday life the pattern of violence promoted by drug dealers, and 
organise the tissue of social life according to – or despite of – the conditioning features of 
trafficking.69 In contrast, police officers treat any dweller as a potential suspect – such as the 
killed youth at Marabá – and their social space is scaled down, rather than negotiated. In the 
program of pacification thus, the processes of social production of space remained alien to the 
favelas.   
Victor highlighted that with two important aspects of this pacification: first, the police 
is scaling down interests and logics that are not part of the territory of favela and that breaks 
the spatial sociability built over the years, and second that from the perspective of the favela 
there was nothing particular in this period that required the intervention of UPP, i.e. the 
pattern of violence at favelas disregarded by the state was long-standing in the territory. There 
should be something external to territory that triggered the program then. As discussed 
previously, the way in which the state started invading and occupying favelas was also a 
demonstration of power, proving control to capitalist investors, with the approach of the 
World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016.  
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The UPPs created a huge new market, composed of both the favelas internal market to 
be explored by retail businesses and external contractors which would provide services to the 
new territories, sponsored by the state. The number of companies registered in favelas, for 
example, increased by 56% in one year in favelas with UPPs, accessing new credit in the 
market70. Even retailers’ stock share prices rose thanks to the creation of new favela markets, 
which included 280,000 new potential consumers.71 When building state, the new social 
organisation is likely to preserve the power of plutocracy, and this intra-elite solidarity 
becomes unsurprising when we learn the extent of mutual collaboration: the initial funding for 
the UPP program, for example, was donated by a group of private companies (including 
Coca-Cola and Bradesco Bank)72, jointly funding more than USD 10 million/year for the 
maintenance of UPPs. The market largely benefited thus from the framework of legality 
brought to favelas by pacification, which prevented the violence outside and opened up the 
way for a new market in the inside. 
The problem remains that whereas the market seems to be satisfied exploring new 
territories, local residents are now subjected to the coercive forces of both the police and the 
drug dealers – who continue to operate inside the favela. The moments of turmoil described 
above show that although the pacification had reached equilibrium with the occupation of the 
territory, it was an unstable equilibrium. We could say, thus, that the necessary transition from 
the war of manoeuvre to the war of position was not done accordingly. Instead of crafting the 
institutions of state with spatial practices that bring public services to the territories of favela, 
the only real integration that the UPP program is sponsoring is the integration to the market. 
Thus, favela residents did not become citizens, but consumers.  
When interviewing an ex-commander of the pacification program, he demonstrated 
high confidence that even with heavy armoury, drug dealers cannot match the apparatus of 
repression of the state and "will never take the territory back"73. But the question is: haven't 
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they already? The state is certainly using a traditional - and long overcame - perspective of 
territory control as in physical controlling the access of people and resources. The military 
control of the territory should have been followed by the suppression of the previous mode of 
production and transition to war of position. Lefebvre too recognized the role of state violence 
in the production of the capitalist space, but he emphasized that such violence is part of the 
production of the total space, which is conditioned to the balance of power between classes74. 
As Gramsci states, even though for some cases the war of manoeuvre is necessary, “to 
fix one’s mind on the military model is the mark of a fool: politics, here too, must have 
priority over its military aspect”.75 The passive revolution evolves to a change into the 
structure of a given society, which as I have demonstrated is the historic process of crafting a 
new space. It could take a long time to be accomplished, since the first shift would give place 
to further changes that would be then organically absorbed by the subaltern classes, i.e. 
“molecular changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of 
forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes”.76 But this process presupposes a pre-
disposition for the long-run game of statecraft. 
Conclusion 
The program of pacification represents a unique evolution in the territorial integration of the 
city, and has been much welcome by many, who still recall recent cases of oppression, threats 
and homicides. Life under the ruling of criminal groups can lead to arbitrary violence, and 
stability can be broken by the slightest dispute between factions or police operations. After the 
UPPs, the annual number of homicides inside favelas decreased by 60 people / 100,000 
habitants77, which means that more than 200 lives are spared every year78. Not to mention the 
benefits of new investments being made in the territory. However, the actions unfolded from 
this first step are showing that the chosen pathway is not being effective in building state 
resilience, and the ruling class is sponsoring an actual integration to the market only by means 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quaterly, 
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1109437 
of a Weberian understanding of state as an organisation that uphold the monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force. 
The analysed case shows that the Gramscian framework has a lot to say about 
contemporary power struggles, and not only to the European context.79 The explored case of 
Rio is the manifestation of passive revolution, based on the transition from war of manoeuvre 
to the war of position, with decapitation of the opposing groups and the absorption of leaders 
from subaltern groups. Several elements reinforce this interpretation, as presented here, such 
as the avoidance of allied militia areas, the military occupation, and the attempt of 
transformation of the local culture. This mechanism of passive revolution is still not fully 
hegemonic, but was nonetheless relatively stable in many aspects. However, illuminated by 
Lefebvre, a spatial account was also able to reveal in this case that the spatial marks of the 
previous mode of production were not suppressed and the transition to war of position did not 
properly occur. The presence of state continued to be largely concentrated on the apparatus of 
repression, and for most of the program duration, consumption was prioritized over state 
building, probably expecting that the capitalist market would have produced the consent 
which the state armoured with coercion. The paradigm of fragile/weak state in the territory is 
still strong and largely unchallenged by everyday practices of state crafting. 
The use of sociospatial functions to read revolutionary processes sheds light on the 
elements of power and hegemony attainment.  The focus on the inhibition of armed conflicts 
while letting the dominant economic practices of drug dealers in favelas undisturbed – i.e. 
drug trafficking – is of the highest importance in this case because it increased the 
contradiction between the ruling groups that dominate legal and illegal market, or in other 
words, “social relations of production which cannot fail to leave their mark on space and 
indeed to revolutionize it”.80 Whereas UPPs increased the everyday freedom of local residents 
and alleviated violence in the surrounding areas, the dispute over spatial hegemony in the 
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territory was considerably neglected. The existence of such contradiction can be tolerated 
only insofar as these contradictory social spaces don’t try to overcome each other, which 
depends on the maintenance of a fragile equilibrium of fraud, coercion and consent.  
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